Can my Google Admin account be compromised over open wireless?







COLLEGE OF Saint Benedict 🖶 Saint John's UNIVERSITY

- Enik Pluimer Network Administrator
 - Saint Joseph Collegeville, MN
 - 2 Campuses 6 Miles Apart
 - Undergraduate Enrollment 3,405
 - 17,000 Switch Ports
 - 1,100 Access Points





Google Admin: Compromised?







History Hardware / Software Attacks Lab Demo Mitigation







History

















Dear Lamer,

You just got popped with some 0-day s**t.

Mess with the best and die like the rest. Should have just bought a t-shirt.

You're going to mess around with someone's Wi-Fi in Vegas at a f***ing hacker con? What the h*ll did you expect?

Your sh*t's all wrecked now. If you really are the bad*ss you're pretending to be, you ought to be able to fix it.

If you have no idea what is going on then I recommend you take this back to the Hak5 booth, ask for a refund, and stop sh***ing-up the Wi-Fi.

Read the f^{***}ing code the next time you buy super elite skiddie hax0r gear. This s^{**}t is criminally insecure.

Sincerely,

@IHuntPineapples













































Hardware





USB / DC / POE / Battery powered USB Port - GPS, Ethernet, WiFi, Modems, Androids **Ethernet and Serial Ports** Micro SD Slot for storage External antenna capability Mobile auditing Long term deployments BrainSt



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Software





PineAP: Rogue Access Point Listens for your probe requests Mimics your preferred networks Auto connect devices Known as Evil Twin attack





Evil Portal: Rogue Captive portal Present users cloned versions of known sites Harvest credentials Potentially inject malware Be annoying





DNSSpoof: Rogue DNS Server Redirect users from trusted domain names Present fake pages Assists EvilPortal





SSL Split:

SSL/TLS Proxy

Forge Certificates

Decode Plaintext





NMAP: Port mapping utility TCPDUMP: Packet capture utility WPS: (Pushbutton Security) attacks MDK3: Suite of wireless protocol attacks





Attacks: Persistent and Targeted Denial of Service Wireless Security **Application Protocols** Social





Reverse SSH tunnel back to CNC Collect data and patterns and be 'quiet' Log data locally or to a remote server

Entice a single client with targeted methods Reduce the chance of detection

Persistent:

- Targeted:



Annoy people

Pick on a single MAC or everyone Skip around on channels sending de-authentication Jamming and Spamming: Randomroll, Occupineapple

Denial of Service:





Wireless security: MAC (Data Link) layer Exploit on boarding features like WPS Capture the 4-way handshake for offline cracking New attack on WPA/WPA2 using PMKID KRACK attack / forced nonce reuse





GPUHASH.me^{BETA}

Tasks queu	e Add n	ew task Get result Verify WPA Contact us				Hide que
Tasks queued:	194 WPA pro	cessed: 100057 WPA cracked: 27.98/34.07% Hashes processed: 4.79M	Hashes cracked:	33.96% GPU cluster s	speed: WPA: 7.76MH/s	3
WPA: 941KH/s	WPA: 702KH/s	WPA: 1.10MH/s WPA WPA: 1.18MH/s WPA: 741KH/s WPA: 866KH/s WPA	: 796KH/s WPA: 1.44N	IH/s IDLE IDLE		
Task ID	Туре	Description	Priority	Status	Time spent	Attack configuration
o 2duT	NTLM	[NetNTLMv2] Digests: 14, salts: 14	1	Waiting payment	-	Advanced search
o GZyV	NTLM	[NetNTLMv1] Digests: 2, salts: 2	1	Waiting payment	- <u>8</u>	Advanced search
N7U6	WPA			Waiting payment	- 6 5	Basic search
6LvX	WPA	FASTWEB-DEK084	1	Waiting payment	- 33	10 HEX uppercase
= 5NME	WPA	WFM918	0	Waiting approval	- 64 - 53	Basic search
= A3xt	WPA	WATASHI_2.4G	0	Waiting approval	-	Basic search
= 91we	WPA	Voice_Audit_Store	0	Waiting approval	-	Basic search
= 38Dm	WPA	true_home2G_Kb6	0	Waiting approval	- 6	Basic search
= 99ng	WPA	Nodu	0	Waiting approval	-333	Basic search
= EB1B	WPA	cpfm	0	Waiting approval		Basic search
= Bqt6	WPA	CASPER CJ	0	Waiting approval	-	Basic search
— DBC9	WPA	Brandt House2	0	Waiting approval	- 19	Basic search
= 3hef	WPA	BestNetWork	0	Waiting approval	-	Basic search
= 9Hjz	WPA	adwifiadmin	0	Waiting approval	- 12	Basic search





Application Protocols:

Degrade secure HTTPS sessions to plaintext HTTP Harvest data from un-secure forms Steal un-secure HTTP session cookies Steal session data and credentials from other apps





Social Attacks:

Manipulate user trust Present fraudulent data Install malicious payloads Harvest data



















De-authentication frame

















Mitigation:

User

Application

Infrastructure





User Mitigation: Disable auto-connect Don't use open networks But if you do: Pay attention Don't transmit sensitive data Forget networks before leaving Use VPN or cellular network





Application Mitigation: Keep your Apps and browsers updated Always use HTTPS Be aware of cleartext forms Use HSTS to prevent downgrade HTTP session cookies vulnerable Deploy Password Alert extension for Chrome HTTPS Everywhere for Chrome



Infrastructure Mitigation: Patch and update code often Preferred encryption WPA2 EAP-TLS Avoid open networks for your clients Enforcement of security policies Detect with WIPS: Multiple SSID per MAC Bridging of wired traffic





WPA3 and WPA3 Enhanced Open? WPA2 - Enterprise EAP-TLS WPA2 Enterprise EAP-PEAP WPA2 - PPSK WPA2-PSK WPS and Open





Known networks are "scored" based on your actions. If you manually switch to an SSID, its score increases. If you manually disconnect from an SSID, its score decreases. "Most preferred" networks have higher scores.

If iOS finds multiple networks after evaluating the above criteria, iOS prioritizes SSIDs by security level and chooses one based on the following order:

	Network Category	Network Security
1	Private	EAP
2	Private	WPA
3	Private	WEP
4	Private	Unsecure/Open
5	Public	HS2.0/Passpoint
6	Public	EAP
7	Public	WPA
8	Public	WEP
9	Public	Unsecure/Open

If iOS finds multiple networks of identical category and security level, it chooses the SSID with the strongest received signal strength indication (RSSI). Learn more about RSSI and wireless roaming for enterprise.







HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) is an HTTP Header that tells a client (aka a browser) that it should only be allowed to connect with the site with a valid HTTPS certificate.









Server must follow HSTS protocols Previous HTTPS session required within timeframe Site owners can use HSTS to identify users without cookies Cookies can be manipulated from sub-domains





HTTP Strict Transport Security https://www.chromium.org/hsts https://hstspreload.org https://badssl.com/ chrome://net-internals/#hsts





When it comes to networking info sec, vigilance is key. The most secure option is to never use public Wi-Fi networks at all. -Daniel Oberhaus





Thank you!



